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HAROLD A. ACKERMAN, Senior District Judge 
 On this appeal, we are faced with several interrelated 
jurisdictional issues arising out of appellant Long Bay Trust's 
inverse condemnation action filed in the District Court of the 
Virgin Islands and the Government of the Virgin Islands' 
("government") parallel eminent domain action filed in the 
Territorial Court of the Virgin Islands.  Both cases involved the 
same parcels of land. 
 First, we must determine whether the government's eminent 
domain case was properly removed from Territorial Court to the 
district court.  Second, we must assess the impact, if any, of 
the district court's order consolidating the eminent domain and 
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inverse condemnation cases following the removal from the 
Territorial Court, and the parties' subsequent submission of 
their claims to binding arbitration. 
 For the following reasons, we conclude that the district 
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the 
government's eminent domain case and that the case was therefore 
improperly removed to the district court.  Ultimately, this lack 
of jurisdiction requires us to vacate the district court's order 
confirming the arbitration award.  The eminent domain and inverse 
condemnation cases will be remanded to the district court with 
instructions to remand the eminent domain case to the territorial 
court.  Finally, for the reasons we set forth below, the district 
court is to consider abstaining from deciding the inverse 
condemnation case. 
I.  FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
   A. Introduction 
 This appeal involves a dispute that arose out of the Virgin 
Island Government's plans to condemn a portion of privately-owned 
commercial property located in the Virgin Islands.  Sometime 
prior to 1988, the government began planning to improve traffic 
circulation on or about Long Bay Road and Route 313 in the Virgin 
Islands.  The project, which was to be 100% U.S. federally 
funded, and was known as the "Long Bay Road Highway Improvement 
Project" required the use of additional land.  Accordingly, the 
Virgin Islands government commenced negotiations for the "taking" 
of private land that would be needed for the project. 
4 
 Specifically, the government required approximately 2.64 
acres of land known as Parcels No. 6 and No. 9, located in Estate 
Thomas, Kings Quarter, St. Thomas.  The property was commercially 
zoned and several buildings were situated upon the land.  During 
December 1988 or January 1989, the government commenced 
negotiations with the owners of the property, Millad Associates, 
for the acquisition of the property.   
 Before a deal could be ironed out with the government, 
Millad Associates sold the property to Jolie Stahl and Barry 
Brown, as co-trustees ("trustees") of the Long Bay Trust.  The 
purchasers paid $3.25 million for both the property and the 
buildings situated upon the property.  A deed to the property was 
executed by the parties on May 9, 1989, and the deed was recorded 
on May 31, 1989.  At the time of purchase, the trustees were 
aware of the government's plans to "take" a portion of the 
property. 
 
B. The Litigation 
 Three years after the trustees purchased the subject 
property, the trustees filed an inverse condemnation action in 
the District Court of the Virgin Islands against the government, 
alleging that the government had unreasonably delayed in taking 
portions of the trust property.  According to the trustees, the 
government had deprived the trust of the highest and best value 
of its property by unreasonably delaying in the condemnation of 
Lots 6 and 9, while at the same time condemning property across 
the street from the two lots.  The trustees contended that this 
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sequence of events allowed a competitor to get a head-start on 
business, to the detriment of the trust.  Moreover, the trustees 
alleged that they could not secure financing or tenants while the 
government's proposed taking was pending.2   
 The government responded to the trustees' federal court 
action on August 13, 1992, by filing an eminent domain action, 
pursuant to V.I. Code Ann. tit. 28, § 411 (1957 & Supp. 1994), in 
the Virgin Islands Territorial Court.  The government alleged in 
its complaint that the property was worth approximately $1.2 
million.  Furthermore, the government submitted a Declaration of 
Taking and an Order Vesting Title.  The order vesting title was 
signed by Judge Ive Arlington Swan on September 1, 1992. 
 On September 14, 1992, the trustees filed a notice of 
removal seeking to remove the government's territorial court 
eminent domain action to the District Court of the Virgin 
Islands.  App. 10-13.  The government thereafter moved to dismiss 
the removal petition, arguing that removal was improper because 
the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over 
                     
2See App. 215 (Appellees' Inverse Condemnation Complaint 
(D.V.I.)).  The government filed a motion to dismiss the inverse 
condemnation suit on May 29, 1992.  The government argued that 
the action should be dismissed for failure to state a claim 
because the government's failure to act on the condemnation at 
issue was not amenable to court scrutiny.  Furthermore, the 
government alleged that the district court lacked jurisdiction to 
hear the inverse condemnation case.  See App. 231-57 (containing 
filings pertinent to the motion to dismiss).  The district court 
denied the government's motion in its entirety on March 11, 1993. 
App. 256-57. 
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the eminent domain claim.3  The district court denied the motion 
to dismiss. 
 According to the court, diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction supported removal of the eminent domain case to 
federal court.  The court reasoned that complete diversity of 
citizenship existed between the Government of the Virgin Islands 
and the trustees.  Furthermore, the court found that the 
trustees' tenants were merely nominal parties to the action whose 
citizenship could be disregarded for purposes of establishing 
diversity jurisdiction.  The district court therefore found that 
it had subject matter jurisdiction over the government's eminent 
domain case and the court denied the government's motion to 
dismiss the removal petition. 
 The government renewed its jurisdictional argument in a 
motion for reconsideration.  According to the government, the 
trustees erroneously relied upon the citizenship of the Territory 
of the Virgin Islands in invoking the diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction of the district court.  The government argued that 
because the citizenship of the territory could not be relied upon 
for purposes of establishing diversity jurisdiction, the district 
                     
3The government filed its motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h).  It appears, however, that the 
government's motion should have been filed as a motion to remand 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), which states that "[i]f at any 
time before final judgment it appears that the district court 
lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."  
Whether the government labeled its motion as motion to dismiss or 
as a motion to remand, does not, however, have any impact on the 
outcome of this case. 
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court did not have diversity jurisdiction over the eminent domain 
case.  The government argued that removal was therefore improper. 
 The district court denied the motion for reconsideration, 
without discussion, in an order dated December 6, 1993. 
 
C. The Arbitration 
 Following the trustees' successful removal of the eminent 
domain case, two actions involving lots 6 and 9 were left pending 
in the District Court of the Virgin Islands.  Eventually, the two 
actions were consolidated for both discovery purposes and for 
trial without a jury.  See Appellee's Brief, at 7.  Thereafter, 
the government and the trustees entered into a joint stipulation 
to refer their controversies to binding arbitration.  App. 125. 
The stipulation specified that the parties would abide by the 
award rendered, and that the district court could enter judgement 
on the arbitration award.  App. 126. 
 An arbitration hearing was held on October 5 and 6, 1994. 
Alex Gonzalez, Esq., served as the arbitrator.  App. 126.  The 
arbitrator issued his findings on October 24, 1994.  App. 128. 
The trustees of the Long Bay Trust were awarded a total of 
$2,891,158.00.  App. 134. 
 
D. Post Arbitration Litigation 
 The Government of the Virgin Islands filed a motion to 
dismiss the arbitration award on December 7, 1994.  App. 104. The 
government claimed that its agents had acted without statutory 
authority when they had signed the arbitration agreement.  
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Furthermore, the government argued that the district court was 
without statutory jurisdiction under the Federal Arbitration Act 
("FAA") to confirm the arbitration award.  App. 104-105.  The 
trustees moved to confirm the arbitration award on February 13, 
1995. 
 The district court denied the government's motion to dismiss 
and granted the trustees' motion to confirm the arbitration award 
in a memorandum opinion and order dated March 31, 1995.  App. 
161-167.  According to the court, both the government and the 
trustees signed the arbitration agreement voluntarily.  This in 
itself constituted an enforceable contract under the FAA, the 
court reasoned, which the court could enforce.  Despite the 
government's obfuscation, the court noted, the proceeding was 
governed by the FAA, and the trustees could seek entry of 
judgment on the arbitration award. 
 Furthermore, the court noted that the joint stipulation 
stated that the government would abide by and perform any award 
rendered by the arbitrator.  Even if the parties mistakenly 
referred to irrelevant statutes in the stipulation (which the 
government contended deprived the district court of 
jurisdiction), the court found that the parties' intention to 
arbitrate their dispute was clearly evidenced by the stipulation. 
The court therefore denied the government's motion to dismiss the 
arbitration award and granted the trustees' motion to confirm the 
arbitration award.  App. 167. 
 Finally, the court also took issue with the government's 
written submissions in support of its motion to dismiss. 
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According to the court, the government's brief did not contain 
one citation to precedent.  Furthermore, the court noted that 
"[c]onsidered as a whole, the Government's motion papers are 
inexcusably opaque and insufficiently supported by case law." 
App. 167.  Accordingly, the court determined that the government 
would be sanctioned.  The court ordered the Government to pay all 
costs and attorneys' fees associated with the motion.  The 
Government was, however, given an opportunity to show cause why 
it had not violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure by filing the motion.  The Trustees were directed to 
file an affidavit of costs and attorney fees.  App. 163-67.  At 
the present time, the district court has not rendered its 
decision on the sanctions issue. 
 
II.  DISCUSSION 
 The government filed a timely notice of appeal from the 
district court's final order and judgment confirming the 
arbitrator's award.  This order was final within the meaning of 
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and we may therefore exercise jurisdiction over 
the government's appeal from that order.4 
                     
4The district court also ordered the government to show cause by 
April 14, 1995, why it should not be sanctioned for its written 
submissions on the motion to dismiss the arbitration award.  The 
government argues on appeal that the district court abused its 
discretion in imposing sanctions.  At the same time, however, the 
government concedes that the district court has not yet issued a 
final order quantifying or even definitively imposing sanctions. 
 A court of appeals clearly does not have jurisdiction to 
review an order which has not yet been issued.  The court is 
therefore without jurisdiction to review the sanctions which may 
be imposed upon the government.  We hasten to add, however, that 
our lack of jurisdiction over the sanctions issue does not 
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 Proper appellate jurisdiction does not, however, relieve us 
from inquiring into the propriety of the district court's 
exercise of jurisdiction in this case.  Employers Ins. of Wausau 
v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 905 F.2d 42, 45 (3d Cir. 1990) (citing 
Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S. 
Ct. 1326, 1331, 89 L. Ed.2d 501 (1986)).  We exercise plenary 
review in determining whether the district court was vested with 
subject matter jurisdiction.  Bumberger v. Insurance Co. of North 
America, 952 F.2d 764, 766 (3d Cir. 1991). 
 
A. The Eminent Domain Case Was Improvidently Removed From 
Territorial Court 
 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permit a defendant in a 
state court action to remove that action to a federal forum.  See 
28 U.S.C. § 1441, applicable in the Virgin Islands under 48 U.S. 
C. § 1613.   As § 1441(a)'s language indicates, removal under 
that section is proper only if the federal district court would 
have had original jurisdiction if the case was filed in federal 
court.  This jurisdictional prerequisite to removal is an 
absolute, non-waivable requirement.  See Allbritton 
Communications Co. v. NLRB, 766 F.2d 812, 820 (3d Cir. 1985), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1081, 106 S. Ct. 850, 88 L. Ed.2d 891 
                                                                  
deprive us of jurisdiction over the larger, substantive issues 
out of which the sanctions issue arose.  See McDonnell v. United 
States, 4 F.3d 1227 (3d Cir. 1993) (finding that unresolved 
attorney fee issues in case does not deprive court of appeals 
from exercising jurisdiction over appeal from underlying 
controversy) (citing Budinich v. Becton Dickinson & Co., 486 U.S. 
196, 198-202, 108 S. Ct. 1717, 1719-22, 100 L.Ed.2d 178 (1988) 
(other citations omitted)); see also Confer v. Custom Eng'g Co., 
952 F.2d 41, 44 (3d Cir. 1991). 
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(1986).  "Because lack of jurisdiction would make any decree in 
the case void and the continuation of the litigation in federal 
court futile, the removal statute should be strictly construed 
and all doubts resolved in favor of remand."  Abels v. State Farm 
Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985) (citations 
omitted).  If there is any doubt as to the propriety of removal, 
that case should not be removed to federal court.  See Boyer v. 
Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 1085, 111 S. Ct. 959, 112 L. Ed.2d 1046 (1991); 
Abels, 770 F.2d at 29. 
 Diversity of citizenship subject matter jurisdiction falls 
within the original jurisdiction of the district court and a 
state court case that implicates diversity jurisdiction may 
therefore be removed to federal court.  Abels, 770 F.2d at 29. 
Diversity jurisdiction is properly invoked in cases where there 
is complete diversity of citizenship between plaintiffs and 
defendants and where the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. 
28 U.S.C. § 1332.  See  Development Fin. Corp. v. Alpha Housing & 
Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 158 (3d Cir. 1995) ("It is 
axiomatic that the federal judiciary's diversity jurisdiction 
depends on complete diversity between all plaintiffs and all 
defendants.") (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 
267, 2 L.Ed. 435 (1806)).  For purposes of determining whether 
the complete diversity requirement has been met, the citizenship 
of nominal parties to the litigation may be disregarded.  Abels, 
770 F.2d at 29.  
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 The district court ruled that the Virgin Islands Government 
could be considered a citizen for purposes of establishing 
diversity of citizenship jurisdiction.  We disagree with the 
district court's conclusion.  More than one hundred years ago, 
the United States Supreme Court ruled that a state cannot be 
considered a citizen for purposes of establishing diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction in federal court.  Postal Telegraph 
Cable Co. v. State of Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487, 15 S. Ct. 192, 
194 (1894).  See Ramada Inns, Inc. v. Rosemount Memorial Park 
Assoc., 598 F.2d 1303, 1306 (3d Cir. 1979) ("[I]t is well settled 
that a state is not a citizen within the meaning of the diversity 
statute.") (citations omitted); see also Gable v. Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania, 521 F. Supp. 43, 43-44 (E.D. Pa. 1981) ("The rule 
that a state is not a `citizen' for diversity purposes is a long-
standing one; it enjoys a history of acceptance, which remains 
undiluted by the passage of time.") (citations omitted). 
 In this case, the district court relied upon the citizenship 
of the Territory of the Virgin Islands in finding that diversity 
of citizenship jurisdiction supported removal of the trustees' 
eminent domain case to federal court.  Thus, the question is 
whether the Government of the Virgin Islands constitutes a 
"state" for purposes of establishing diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction.  The trustees argue that the Virgin Islands is not 
a State, but a Territory of the United States and that the 
policies which preclude sovereign immunity for territories in 
federal court similarly preclude a Territory from being 
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considered a "state" for purposes of establishing diversity 
jurisdiction.  We are not persuaded by these arguments. 
 Section 1332 of Title 28 of the United States Code 
specifies, in pertinent part, that "district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions" between "citizens of 
different States."  28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).  According to § 1332(d), 
the "word `States,' as used in this section, includes the 
Territories, the District of Columbia, and the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico."  Accordingly, the Territory of the Virgin Islands, 
a United States Territory, qualifies as a "state" for purposes of 
the diversity jurisdiction statute. 
 As noted above, a state cannot be considered a citizen for 
purposes of establishing diversity of citizenship jurisdiction 
subject matter jurisdiction in federal court.  Therefore, it 
follows that a Territory of the United States, which is 
considered a state pursuant to § 1332(d), also cannot be 
considered a citizen for purposes of establishing diversity of 
citizenship jurisdiction.  The Territory of the Virgin Islands 
should not have been considered a citizen for purposes of 
establishing diversity jurisdiction in the court below.  Cf. Mann 
v. District of Columbia, 742 F.2d 750, 752 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(concluding that District of Columbia did not qualify as a 
citizen for purposes of diversity of citizenship jurisdiction 
because § 1332(d) specified that the District of Columbia (like 
the territory of the Virgin Islands) was to be construed as a 
"state" for purposes of the diversity statute). 
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 Therefore, the district court did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the eminent domain case and the case was 
improvidently removed from the Territorial Court.5 
 
B. The District Court's Post-Removal Actions 
 We have concluded that the government's eminent domain case 
was improvidently removed to federal court.  In the ordinary 
case, this conclusion would lead us to remand the action to the 
district court with instructions to remand the case to the state 
court.  See Abels, 770 F.2d at 27.  This case does not, however, 
fit within the mold of a garden variety improvidently removed 
case. 
 The district court engaged in actions subsequent to the 
removal of the government's case which served to integrate the 
jurisdictionally improper eminent domain case with the trustees' 
jurisdictionally proper inverse condemnation case.  Following 
removal of the eminent domain case, the eminent domain and 
inverse condemnation cases were consolidated for discovery 
purposes and for trial without a jury.  Thereafter, the parties 
entered into a stipulation to submit all of their claims to an 
arbitrator.  Finally, the parties' claims were reduced to one 
award from the arbitrator and the court entered an order and 
judgment confirming that award. 
                     
5In view of this conclusion, there is no need for us to address 
the question of whether the trustees' tenants were nominal 
parties in the eminent domain proceeding. 
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 We must determine whether the district court's merger of the 
inverse condemnation case with the substantively similar, but 
jurisdictionally deficient eminent domain case precluded the 
district court from exercising its jurisdiction over the inverse 
condemnation case.  For the reasons set forth below, we have 
determined that the district court could not properly exercise 
its jurisdiction over the inverse condemnation case. 
 It is clear in this case that due to the similarity of the 
issues in the two cases, the district court's post-consolidation 
exercise of jurisdiction over the jurisdictionally proper inverse 
condemnation case also constituted an exercise of authority over 
the government's jurisdictionally improper eminent domain case. A 
court may not, however exercise authority over a case for which 
it does not have subject matter jurisdiction.  See Bender v. 
Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541, 106 S. Ct. 1326, 
1331, 89 L. Ed.2d 501 (1986)).  Neither consolidation with a 
jurisdictionally proper case nor an agreement by the parties can 
cure a case's jurisdictional infirmities.  See McKenzie v. United 
States, 678 F.2d 571, 574 (5th Cir. 1982) (consolidation of 
jurisdictionally deficient claim with jurisdictionally proper 
claim does not cure jurisdictional defects) (citations omitted); 
Reich v. Local 30, IBT, 6 F.3d 978, 982 n.5 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(parties to action cannot waive subject matter jurisdiction 
requirements by consenting to court's jurisdiction) (citations 
omitted).  Nonetheless, the district court's consolidation of the 
cases and the parties' subsequent arbitration agreement had the 
practical effect of permitting the district court to exercise 
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authority over a case for which it did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction.  We are unwilling to approve of this result. 
 The district court could not exercise jurisdiction without 
exercising jurisdiction over the improperly removed eminent 
domain case.  The actions by the court and the parties to this 
action allowed the jurisdictional infirmity of the eminent domain 
case to taint the court's attempts to exercise its subject matter 
jurisdiction over the inverse condemnation case.  It follows that 
we must vacate any orders entered by the district court that were 
entered after the eminent domain case was removed to the district 
court and in which the district court purported to exercise 
jurisdiction over both the eminent domain and inverse 
condemnation case. 
 
C. Restoring the Parties to their Pre Removal 
Postures; Abstention 
 We have determined that the district court erroneously 
denied the government's motion to dismiss the trustees' removal 
petition.  Furthermore, we have determined that the district 
court acted without jurisdiction when it purported to exercise 
authority over the consolidated inverse condemnation and eminent 
domain cases.  Because any post-removal actions taken by the 
court in this case were therefore ineffectual, we have determined 
that restoring the parties to the positions that they occupied 
prior to the removal is the proper course of action for us to 
take on this appeal. 
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 Consequently, we will vacate the district court's order 
confirming the arbitration award as the district court did not 
have jurisdiction to enforce the award in this case.  See 
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 15 n.9, 104 S.Ct. 852, 
861 n.9 (1984).  Furthermore, we will remand the eminent domain 
and inverse condemnation actions to the district court.  The 
district court shall separate the two actions by remanding the 
government's condemnation action to the Territorial Court of the 
Virgin Islands and by retaining jurisdiction over the trustees' 
inverse condemnation action. 
 This disposition of the appeal will restore the parties to 
the positions that they occupied prior to the district court's 
improvident removal and improper exercise of jurisdiction.  Two 
actions involving the same parcels of land will therefore be left 
pending in federal court and territorial court.  Despite our 
resolution of the jurisdictional issues arising from the district 
court's improper removal, we are nonetheless concerned about the 
possibility of the district court's exercise of jurisdiction in 
this case even though the Territorial Court will also be 
exercising its jurisdiction over similar issues.   
 On similar facts, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit ordered the district court to exercise its power 
of abstention.  T.J. Fountain v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid 
Transit Auth., 678 F.2d 1038, 1046 (11th Cir. 1982).  The court 
ruled that the district court should abstain from deciding an 
inverse condemnation case until such time that it became apparent 
that the inverse condemnation plaintiff would not receive the 
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relief it sought in the State of Georgia's previously-filed 
condemnation action.  According to the court, "[a]s has been 
noted many times before, a suit involving state condemnation of 
private property is primarily a local matter that is best left to 
the state courts."  Id.  The court further reasoned that although 
abstention was not required in all condemnation cases, abstention 
was necessary in T.J. Fountain because there was the possibility 
of inconsistent state and federal judgments.  We agree with the 
T.J. Fountain court's analysis. 
 Like the T.J. Fountain court, we too are concerned about the 
problems that may arise from inconsistent judgments in this case. 
Unlike the T.J. Fountain court, however, we believe that the 
abstention decision is one that should be exercised by the 
district court in the first instance.  Therefore, instead of 
ordering the district court to abstain in this matter, we will 
suggest to the district court to consider abstaining in light of 
the parallel Territorial Court action.  As previously noted, the 
Territorial Court had actually entered an order vesting title in 
the government prior to the district court's improper removal. In 
remanding the case, we leave this fact for the district court's 
consideration in its abstention analysis. 
 
 
III.  CONCLUSION 
 The district court's order and judgment confirming the 
arbitration award will be vacated.  The trustees' inverse 
condemnation action and the government's eminent domain action 
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will be remanded to the District Court of the Virgin Islands with 
instructions for the district court to remand the government's 
eminent domain case to the Territorial Court for the Virgin 
Islands.  Finally, in accord with our discussion on T.J. 
Fountain, the district court shall consider whether it should 
abstain from deciding the trustees' inverse condemnation case. 
 We must stress the narrowness of our ruling.  We have 
determined that the district court acted without subject matter 
jurisdiction and was therefore without power to enter the post-
removal order specified above.  It does not necessarily follow 
from this conclusion, however, that the parties' post-removal 
agreement to arbitrate is similarly void and without legal 
effect.  Thus, our opinion does not preclude further litigation 
on the point.  Indeed, it is possible that if the arbitration 
award can be enforced in a jurisdictionally correct proceeding, 
this entire controversy may be put to rest without the need for 
extensive proceedings on the remand.  Nonetheless, we do not  
express an opinion on whether the parties' agreement to arbitrate 
20 
can survive our conclusion that the district court was without 
power to enter decisions on that agreement. 
_________________________ 
